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While large-scale demonstrations were still fanningout from Lhasa to the rest of the Tibetan areasin March 2008, the usual developmental alibi
were being laid out by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). Beijing argued that the “riots” (in reference to the
riot in Lhasa on 14 March) were due to political meddling
and manipulation from abroad, particularly from the Tibetan
exile community and their Western supporters; given that
the region had been experiencing ample development and
rising prosperity, local Tibetans had no valid cause for griev-
ance. This line was supported by the regular collection of
Western scholars and commentators who, at the extreme,
tended to interpret the events as the covert handiwork of
U.S. neocons. (1)
Indeed, absolute economic and human development indica-
tors offer little insight into the reasons why Tibetans might
have been so aggrieved. Poverty rates had been falling, aver-
age household incomes rising, and levels of educational at-
tainment moderately improving. Were it not for some restric-
tions on cultural or religious practice, or the worrisome rise
in inequalities, many argued that the government had been
tending well the disadvantaged position of Tibetans in
China. Many Chinese commentators went so far as to con-
clude that Tibetans, lavishly coddled by central government
subsidies to a far greater extent than any other minority na-
tionality in China, are quite simply spoilt, complaining with
their stomachs full. (2)
This simplistic developmental discourse unfortunately ig-
nores how the manner by which western development strate-
gies have been implemented in the Tibetan areas since the
mid-1990s has itself been a key factor exacerbating the un-
resolved contestations of Chinese rule in these areas. Within
a context of continued political disempowerment of Tibetan
locals, these strategies have channelled massive amounts of
subsidies and subsidised investments (relative to the local
economy) through the government itself or else through Chi-
nese corporations based outside the Tibetan areas. This has
accentuated the already highly externalised orientation of
wealth flows in the economy, resulting in a socio-economic
structure that rewards a small upper stratum, which includes
a small minority of Tibetans and a large proportion of non-
Tibetan migrants, mostly concentrated in urban areas and
well positioned to access the flows of wealth as they pass
through the region with increasing velocity. 
Subsidisation strategies thus result in a form of “boomerang
aid.” Subsidies largely return to their sender while debilitat-
ing indigenously-oriented forms of wealth creation and accu-
mulation in most sectors of the economy outside agriculture.
This reinforces a situation of extraordinary inefficiency and
extreme dependence, as well as strong cultural, linguistic,
and political biases that derive from axes of advantage stem-
ming from characteristics of the dominant cultural and polit-
ical group, such as Chinese fluency, Chinese work cultures,
and connections to government or business networks in
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1. The most prominent Western scholar in this regard is Barry Sautman, “Protests in Tibet
and separatism: The Olympics and beyond,” China Left Review, 2008, 1. For an extreme
position, see W. Engdahl, “Risky geopolitical game: Washington plays ‘Tibet roulette’
with China,” Center for Research on Globalization, 10 April 2008. See Emily T. Yeh, “Tibet
and the problem of radical reductionism,” Antipode, forthcoming (August or October
2009), for an excellent review and critique of this literature.
2. Again, see Sautman, art. cit., for allusions to these arguments.
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This article examines how rapid growth in the Tibetan areas of West China since the mid-1990s has been a key factor
exacerbating the unresolved contestations of Chinese rule in these areas. Amidst the continued political
disempowerment of Tibetan locals, Beijing has used recent development strategies to channel massive amounts of
subsidies through the government itself or through Chinese corporations based outside the Tibetan areas, thereby
accentuating the already highly-externalised orientation of the local economy. These processes offer important
insight into the recent explosion of tensions. 
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China Proper. These biases are most evident in the context
of competition with non-Tibetan migrants from other parts of
China, which I have discussed elsewhere. (3) Nonetheless, it
is important to note that the in-migration of non-Tibetan
(and Tibetan) outsiders is itself driven by the polarising im-
plications of these development strategies. 
This is an important distinction from the argument that eth-
nic inequalities in the TAR and other Tibetan areas are the
result of spatial inequalities (i.e. that Tibetans are mostly
rural and poor, hence ethnic inequalities reflect urban-rural
inequality). (4) Rather, inequalities differ from elsewhere in
China in that they are instituted through the special treat-
ment accorded to the Tibetan areas by the Chinese state,
which results in a progressive appropriation of ownership in
the local economy by outsiders, placing local Tibetans at a
disadvantage despite the profusion of subsidies. The degree
to which discrimination is specifically or systematically in-
tended within these strategies is perhaps less important than
the fact that the result is effectively discriminatory. In any
case, the strong perception of discrimination in the eyes of
local Tibetans offers important insights into the explosion of
tensions in March 2008. 
The article is based on an ongoing project of quantitative
analysis of official statistical data combined with over a year
of cumulated fieldwork in Western China from 2003 to
2008. (5) The analysis focuses on the Tibet Autonomous Re-
gion (TAR) by necessity, given that the TAR is the only
province-level jurisdiction that is indigenously Tibetan in its
entirety, whereas Han Chinese dominate both the rural and
urban data of Qinghai, the province with the next highest
proportion of Tibetans in its population. The focus is
nonetheless appropriate for this study given that the TAR is
the reference point of arguments that Beijing lavishes re-
sources on Tibetans. If the argument is tenuous in the TAR,
it is likely to be irrelevant in the Tibetan areas outside the
TAR, which are much less fiscally privileged than the TAR
even though exhibiting many of the same structural disadvan-
tages, such as extreme lags in education levels. 
The article is divided into three sections. The first reviews the
economic lagging of the TAR in the early part of the reform
period and its subsequent economic take-off from the mid-
1990s onwards. The second examines the heavily subsidised
sources of this take-off through an analysis of government ex-
penditure and investment. The last section explores how insti-
tuted patterns of ownership accentuate the externally-depend-
ent and ethnically-discriminatory characteristics of growth.
The article concludes with reflections on the conflictive impli-
cations of Chinese boomerang aid to Tibetan areas. 
T he  e cono mi c bust  a nd b oo mo f  T ib et  i n  the  re form  pe ri od
The speed of recent economic growth in the TAR has been
phenomenal, even by recent Chinese standards. The Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the TAR more than quadru-
pled from 1997 to 2007. In comparison, the Chinese econ-
omy tripled over the same period, which was the fastest (and
largest) experience of rapid economic growth the world had
ever seen. In the TAR, growth had been about one-third
faster. 
This had not always been the case. The TAR and Qinghai,
which together account for about three-quarters of the Ti-
betan population and territory in China, had been the worst
cases of economic lagging in China from the beginning of the
reform period until the mid-1990s. Lagging was not merely
relative to the take-off in Eastern China; the TAR was actu-
ally in recession in real per capita terms (i.e., accounting for
price inflation and population growth) for much of the 1980s
and up until the mid-1990s. As a result, the per capita GDP
of the TAR fell to the second lowest in China in 1996. Eco-
nomic conditions in the Tibetan areas outside the TAR were
probably similar if not worse, given that they were much less
fiscally privileged than the TAR, and thus more severely af-
fected by these dynamics of regional development.
Economic lagging derived from several major shifts in re-
gional development policy that accompanied the reform pe-
riod, resulting in immediate macroeconomic stagnation in
northwest China and the TAR in the early 1980s. Industrial
investment was redirected away from the interior and to-
wards the coastal areas. Fiscal decentralisation and enter-
prise reforms quickly eroded the system of regional redistri-
bution, resulting in a marked decline in the level of subsidy
that was directed by the centre to the western provinces. (6)
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3. See Andrew Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent
Economic Growth, Copenhagen, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2005; Andrew
Fischer, “A Theory of Polarisation, Exclusion and Conflict within Disempowered
Development: The case of contemporary Tibet in China,” PhD thesis, London School of
Economics, 2007; Andrew Fischer, “‘Population Invasion’ versus Urban Exclusion in the
Tibetan Areas of Western China,” Population and Development Review, vol. 34, n° 4,
2008, pp. 631-662; Andrew Fischer, “Educating for Exclusion in Western China:
Structural and Institutional Dimensions of Conflict in the Tibetan Areas of Qinghai and
Tibet,” CRISE Working Paper (July 2009), Oxford, Centre for Research on Inequality,
Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House; http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/
abstract.shtml?wp69.
4. See Barry Sautman and Irene Eng, “Tibet: Development for Whom?,” China Information,
vol. XV, n° 2, 2001, pp. 20-74. 
5. See the appendix in Andrew Fischer, “‘Population Invasion’ versus Urban Exclusion in the
Tibetan Areas of Western China,” art. cit., for details on the data and methods used. 
6. For an excellent discussion of local government finance in China, see Christine Wong
(ed.), Financing Local Government in the PRC, Hong Kong, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1997.
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However, the strategy of under-pricing agricultural and raw
material output was maintained up until the early 1990s as
a means of subsidising coastal industries. The combination
had a disproportionately depressing impact on the western
provinces, given that their economies were more agrarian or
raw material-based than the coastal areas, and that their
public revenues were heavily dependent on subsidies. The
Tibetan areas were especially impacted given that they were
the most agrarian in China. (7)
Such realities were not overlooked, and several decisive policy
initiatives were taken. (8) These included: the 8-7 poverty re-
duction plan in 1994, complemented in the TAR by the Third
Tibet Work Forum; the focus on western development in the
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000); and the “Open the
West” campaign (OWC; xibu da kaifa) announced in 1999,
which complemented the Tenth Five-Year Plan and was sup-
ported in the TAR by the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001.
As a result, spending and investment increased in the western
region, and economic growth picked up from the mid-1990s
onwards. Rapid growth started in the TAR in 1996, surpass-
ing national growth rates from 1996 to 1999 and again from
2001 to 2003. Rapid growth started in Qinghai in 1998.
However, this rapid growth in the TAR was dislocated from
productive sectors, particularly agriculture, which was the
largest sector up to 1996 and employed about three quarters
of the workforce in 2000 (mostly Tibetan). While aggregate
GDP in the TAR doubled from 2000 to 2005, the GDP
contribution of agriculture only grew by about one third,
falling in share from 42 percent of GDP in 1995 to 17.5 per-
cent in 2006. Industry and mining grew from a very small
base by about three quarters, remaining at around 7 percent
of GDP. On the other hand, the GDP value of construction
almost tripled, increasing from around 11 percent of GDP in
1996 to 20 percent in 2006, becoming larger than agricul-
ture and almost three times larger than industry and mining
(in every other province in China, construction is only a frac-
tion of industry). Although construction was disconnected
from productive activities, it was closely related to the terti-
ary sector (a combination of government and party adminis-
40 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
7. See Dali Yang, Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China, London,
Routledge, 1997, and Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet, op. cit., for
more detail on these dynamics of regional development.
8. See Yang, Beyond Beijing, op. cit., on debates in China about these issues in the early to
mid-1990s.
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tration; social services such as education and health; trade
and commerce; transport; and various other services), which
also almost tripled. The tertiary sector rose from 34 percent
of total GDP in 1995 to 55 percent by 2006, becoming the
largest sector of the TAR (see Figure 1).
The experience of the TAR was starkly dissimilar to all
other provinces of western China, including Qinghai, the
province most similar to the TAR in terms of topography
and demography. Subsidisation strategies in all other west-
ern provinces were focused on intensively restructuring the
antiquated industrial base left over from Maoist interior in-
dustrialisation strategies of the 1960s and 1970s. In all these
cases, intensive subsidisation and construction activity bol-
stered the leading role of the industry within a few years. In
China as a whole, secondary industry (including mining, but
only as a very minor share) was generally the largest sector
driving growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s, amounting
to over 40 percent of GDP. Construction actually shrank
from 6.1 to 5.6 percent of GDP over this period despite the
evident construction boom in China. The share of the terti-
ary sector increased considerably, but settled at just under
40 percent by 2006. (9) These patterns were broadly similar
in most western provinces, albeit with a stronger role of the
tertiary sector and construction since 2000, reflecting the
larger role of subsidies and investment under the OWC. (10)
In contrast, rapid growth in the TAR has been based on
rapid tertiarisation and a construction boom alongside de-in-
dustrialisation (i.e., a shrinking GDP share of secondary in-
dustry). The government argues that the new strategy for the
TAR is to move away from past strenuous efforts to create a
secondary industrial base in the TAR and to concentrate in-
stead on tertiary industries (such as tourism) as the new lead
pillars of growth. Indeed, the overwhelming role of the terti-
ary sector does beg for further analysis. 
In this regard, the TAR again contrasts with the rest of
China. While the tertiary share of government and party
agencies in the TAR has always been the highest in China,
at around 20 percent in the mid-1990s, it surged in 2000
and 2001 to over 26 percent, becoming the largest compo-
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9. All data calculated from National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing,
China Statistical Press, 2007, Table 3-1. In subsequent footnotes, CSY will refer to China
Statistical Yearbook.
10. See Fischer, “A Theory of Polarisation,” op. cit., for more detail on Sichuan, Gansu,
Qinghai, and all China.
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nent of the tertiary sector in those two years and accounting
for over 13 percent of total GDP in 2001, or almost twice the
entire mining and industrial activity and close to the total con-
struction activity as well. Government administration had ef-
fectively become the “engine of growth” in the opening years
of the OWC, growing 68 percent in 2000 and 28 percent in
2001. Its share fell slightly in the following years and was sur-
passed by social services (health + ed + ss), although the cat-
egory of “other” (see Figure 2) seems to suggest that govern-
ment administration continued to play a leading role in
growth up to 2006. The category of “other” represents an ag-
gregation of all those tertiary categories no longer reported
from 2004 onwards, of which government administration and
social services are the largest components. Government ad-
ministration probably maintained its share within this cate-
gory, given fairly proportionate increases in government ex-
penditure in both government administration and social serv-
ices. Given the rising GDP share of the tertiary sector up to
2006, it is therefore likely that government administration
maintained a share of overall GDP at around 13 percent if
not more. In comparison, government administration in
China accounted for only 2.7 percent of total GDP in 2006,
while it accounted for 7.7 percent in Qinghai.
The unusually large and rapidly growing category of govern-
ment administration in the TAR (as well as in Qinghai and
Xinjiang, where it also grew rapidly in 2000 and 2001)
might indirectly indicate a military and/or security focus of
the OWC in these provinces. This is of course a matter of
speculation, as military activity is a closely guarded secret in
China. However, the inference is supported by observations
of expansion in military facilities around Lhasa during these
years.
These patterns are further clarified by the contribution of se-
lect sectors to growth in each year, calculated from the above
data (see Figure 3). In China and most western provinces,
the largest sectoral contribution generally came from indus-
try and mining, in line with the above analysis. In the TAR,
the tertiary sector played the leading role in contributing to
GDP growth up to 2006, besides a brief interlude in 2003
when it was surpassed by a huge surge in the secondary sec-
tor, almost entirely due to construction that accounted for 56
percent of GDP growth in that year. The surge was likely re-
lated to the Qinghai-Tibet railway construction, which en-
tered the TAR on a large scale in that year. Otherwise, ter-
tiary activities were contributing on average well over 50 per-
cent of total GDP increase throughout this period, reaching
42 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
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high points of 80 percent in 1996, 87 percent in 2002, and
73 percent in 2005. This means that the sector was not only
large (in terms of GDP share), but also growing fast (share
of GDP growth), in contrast to agriculture, which was large
but contributing little to GDP growth. The other important
feature to note is the degree to which construction almost en-
tirely dominated the contribution of the secondary sector
right up to 2006, while the contribution of industry was mar-
ginal at best, bearing little relation to the contributions of con-
struction or the tertiary sector. 
The tertiary contribution is shown in more detail in Figure
4. Government administration contributed 49 percent of
total GDP increase in 2000, accounting for most of the total
tertiary contribution of 55 percent in that year. This entirely
subsidy-induced performance tapered off by 2003, as con-
struction (shown previously) and transport took over as the
main sources of growth. However, as the major phases of
railway construction were wrapping up after 2004, the terti-
ary category of “other” took off, contributing 78 percent of
total GDP growth in 2005. As previously noted, we can
safely assume that about half of this increase in “other”
came from the expansion of government administration.
From this perspective, although tourism had been booming
throughout this period and undoubtedly fuelled an urban
commercial boom, (11) tourism nonetheless played a second-
ary role in driving growth next to government administration
(and related military and paramilitary activities not included
in these statistics).  
In other words, most of the growth generated in the TAR
over these years derived from an alternating sequencing be-
tween tertiary activities (dominated by government adminis-
tration) and construction (dominated by large construction
projects such as the various components of the Qinghai-
Tibet railway). Both of these drivers were mostly deter-
mined by policies of subsidised spending and investment de-
cided in Beijing and, to a much lesser extent, supported by
various rich coastal provinces in China. Given the weight of
these instituted sources of growth in the local economy,
changes in provincial economic structure have been much
more radical and volatile than elsewhere in China, including
the most similar province of Qinghai.
43N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
11. Tourist numbers to the TAR (mostly domestic Chinese) apparently reached 1.6 million in
2005 and over 4 million in 2007, exceeding the total population of the TAR of about 2.8
million in 2007 (see “Tertiary sector bolsters Tibet economy,” People’s Daily Online, 18
January 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/19/eng20060119_
236599.html; see also People’s Daily “Official figures: Tibetan tourism booming before
riots,” People’s Daily, 25 April 2008.
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The extremely high and increasing scale of both direct and
indirect subsidies in the TAR almost defies logic, given that
they started to exceed total GDP from 2001 onwards. Even
in comparison to Qinghai, the next most subsidised province
of China, it is only the TAR that is treated with such absurd
priority. Hence, it is useful to distinguish several exceptional
features in the composition of these subsidies. For clarifica-
tion, direct subsidies refer to direct budgetary support from
Beijing to the provinces in order to cover provincial deficits
(revenues minus expenditures) given that, with few excep-
tions, Chinese provinces cannot borrow. Indirect subsidies
refer to subsidised investment, which amounts to virtually all
investment in the TAR (including the railway, which was en-
tirely subsidised by Beijing, and provincial aid projects, which
are entirely subsidised by various rich coastal provinces). 
In the case of government expenditure, education has con-
sistently been the largest category of expenditure across
China, including most western provinces, even under the
surging investment and construction that accompanied the
OWC. (12) Both Qinghai and the TAR are exceptional in the
degree to which capital construction (i.e. investment) be-
came the largest category of government expenditure in the
late 1990s and then surged in 2000, reaching a peak of al-
most 30 percent of total government expenditure in Qinghai
in 2002 and 41 percent in the TAR in 2003. It started to
fall in both provinces after these peaks, although by 2006 it
still remained at 29 percent of total expenditure in the TAR
versus 10 percent on education, and 17 percent in Qinghai
versus 11 percent on education.
In terms of its next highest category of government expendi-
ture, the TAR is exceptional even compared to Qinghai,
given the dominance of expenditure on government adminis-
tration from 1996 onwards. In 2004, government administra-
tion accounted for around 18 percent of total government ex-
penditure in the TAR, versus around 10 percent on educa-
tion. Qinghai exhibited a similar prioritisation up to the mid-
1990s, but it fell in line with the western provincial norm in
the 2000s, with the share of government expenditure spent
on government administration settling at slightly less than the
share spent on education. Most other provincial govern-
ments spent substantially less on their own administration
than on education. 
44 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
12. Expenditure data are calculated from CSY, 2005, table 8-15, and equivalent tables in
CSY 1996 to 2004.
A grab parks at a construction site behind the Potala Palace 
on 27 June 2006 in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, China. 
© AFP
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In the case of investment, several unique characteristics
sharply differentiate the composition of investment in the
TAR from all other provinces in China, including Qing-
hai. (13) First, investment in the TAR was dominated by state-
owned units (SOUs), at 84 percent of total investment in
2004, in contrast to 52 percent in Qinghai, and only 36 per-
cent in Sichuan and in China overall. Second, the largest
sector of investment in the TAR was “transport, storage and
post,” at almost 36 percent of total investment in 2004. The
railway would account for a large share of this. In contrast,
the largest sector in all the other provinces was manufactur-
ing, at almost 28 percent of total investment nationally in
2004. Manufacturing investment in the TAR was marginal
at 4.3 percent of total investment, and only 0.6 percent of
total investment was in mining. The second largest sector of
investment in the TAR was in “public management and so-
cial organisation” (the investment term used for government
administration), which accounted for 14 percent of total
TAR investment in 2004, versus only 6 percent in education
and 1 percent in “health, social security and social welfare.”
This was the inverse of every other province in China,
where investment in education was usually double that in
government administration. Finally, 59 percent of total in-
vestment in the TAR was financed by state budgetary appro-
priation in 2004, whereas this source of funding was rela-
tively minor in other western provinces, at only 10 percent in
Qinghai and 3 percent in Sichuan. In every province besides
the TAR, the majority of investment funding comes from
self-raised funds, i.e. reinvested profits. Self-raised funds
were also the second most important source of funds in the
TAR, at 22 percent of total investment, although given the
predominance of out-of-province businesses, these funds
were probably self-raised mostly outside of the TAR. 
On this last point, although the provincial origins of invest-
ment are not divulged in the statistical sources, it is possible
to offer some impressions in the case of the TAR. The 62
aid projects of the Ninth Five-Year Plan amounted to 4.6 bil-
lion yuan, shared equally between Beijing and various
wealthy provinces. This was equivalent to more than half the
GDP and 1.6 times total investment in the TAR in 1996.
Similarly, under the rubric of the OWC and the Tenth Five-
Year Plan, the central government announced that it would
invest 31.2 billion yuan in the TAR, while various Chinese
provinces would invest 1.06 billion yuan. (14) Together, this
was equivalent to about 2.7 times the GDP and 3.9 times
the total investment in the TAR in 2001. The Qinghai-Tibet
railway alone was projected at its outset in 2001 to require
about 26 billion yuan in investment. (15) This alone was al-
most double the total GDP of the TAR in 2001. Even al-
lowing for the fact that it was spread over several years and
shared between both Qinghai and the TAR, the weight of
this single project dwarfed the TAR economy during its con-
struction phases. From this perspective, it is clear that most
investment in the TAR derives from outside the province,
whether from state budgetary appropriations or from the
self-raised funds of state-owned enterprises based outside
the province. 
S u bs idies  an d i nves tmen t as  so ur c es  ofg ro wth
The weight of subsidies in the TAR economy is shown in
Figure 5 below, which measures the ratios of expenditures,
subsidies, and investment to nominal GDP and compares
these to real per capita GDP growth rates measured in con-
stant 2006 prices. The measure for total subsidy (total sub-
sidies/GDP) deducts government expenditure on capital
construction in order to avoid double counting investment in
the final measure of total direct and indirect subsidies. As
noted above, this combined measure approximately reflects
total subsidies only in the specific case of the TAR.
The TAR is exceptional in the degree to which it exhibited
an extreme level of subsidy dependence that did not abate
over time despite the intensity of investment activity. Local
government expenditure remained over 90 percent funded
by direct subsidies throughout this period (“budget
sub/exp”). Moreover, direct budgetary subsidies reached an
astonishing level of 81 percent of GDP in 2002. This fell to
64 percent in 2006, although even this level was very high
in historical comparison. Notably, the huge bulge in the pro-
portion of expenditure and subsidies to GDP from 2000 to
2004 and the shorter bulge after 2004 relate almost entirely
to government expenditure on capital construction. The
value of total investment reached levels unparalleled any-
where in China in recent history, at 77 percent of GDP in
2004 and almost 80 percent in 2006. The peak in 2004 was
no doubt related to the ongoing construction of the railway
in the TAR, which was completed in 2006. The renewed in-
crease in 2006 seems to indicate that the government moved
on to new construction projects. 
The combined level of budgetary subsidy and subsidised in-
vestment to GDP presents the most striking picture of the
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13. Investment data are calculated from China Statistical Yearbook, 2005, Tables 6-3, 6-4,
6-5, and 6-7.
14. TIN, China’s Great Leap West, London, Tibet Information Network, 2000.
15. CSY, 2005, table 6-40.
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total weight of subsidies in the TAR. Following an earlier
peak of 107 percent of GDP in 1995, total subsidies sur-
passed 100 percent of GDP in 2001 and then climbed to
123 percent by 2006. In other words, the central and vari-
ous provincial governments were apparently giving more
money to the TAR than all of the (mostly subsidised) eco-
nomic activity in the province combined. 
With such intensive subsidisation, high growth rates are not
at all surprising. Rather, it is the sheer inefficiency of such
subsidisation that is striking. This can be characterised as a
“negative multiplier effect” of subsidies and investment on
growth. Normally, one dollar of investment or government
spending produces several dollars worth of economic activity
in a year, as the dollar spent is then spent again and again
by others who earn these dollars. However, in the TAR
there was only 0.5 yuan of GDP increase for every yuan of
increased subsidies and investment in 2001. The situation
had hardly improved by 2004, as there was only 0.65 yuan
of GDP increase for each yuan of increased subsidies and
investment. In Qinghai, the next most subsidised province in
China, the multiplier fell below one for a few years in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, reflecting the intense subsidisa-
tion of western development strategies over these years.
However, the multiplier returned positive (above one) after
a few years, reflecting that such subsidisation was directed at
industrial restructuring, as discussed previously. 
The remarkable inefficiency of subsidisation in the TAR is
not new, but has been consistent since the government
started to intensively subsidise the region in the late 1960s.
This was noted by Wang and Bai, (16) who pointed out that
for every one yuan increase in the value of output between
1957 and 1983 in the TAR, subsidies increased by 1.24
yuan, i.e. a negative multiplier effect. According to their
data, the level of subsidy started to increase sharply in 1968.
The proportion of central government subsidies to output
value (equivalent to the subsidy/GDP measure above) in-
creased from 31 percent in the 1950s to 45 percent in the
1960s, 80 percent in the 1970s, and 97 percent in 1980-
1983. Or, the negative multiplier effect that they measured
from 1957 to 1983 was mostly concentrated in the years
from 1968 onwards. They did not clarify that this intensifi-
cation of subsidies occurred simultaneously with the late im-
plementation of collectivisation in the TAR in the midst of
46 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
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the Cultural Revolution and intensive interior industrialisa-
tion strategies, discussed further in the next section.
Similar patterns continued even in the context of reform. For
instance, the nominal value of government expenditure al-
most doubled in 1984 (to 75 percent of GDP), yet the
economy only briefly came out of recession for about two
years. Nominal government expenditure declined sharply in
1986 and then rose gradually thereafter, albeit more slowly
than inflation, helping to explain the recessionary trend in
real per capita GDP from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.
It was only the combined immensity of subsidy and invest-
ment increases from the mid-1990s onwards that served to
buoy up real per capita GDP, although in an extremely in-
efficient manner. 
Returning to the present, the most logical reason that subsi-
dies were greater than total GDP is that a large proportion
of subsidies were spent on imports from abroad or from else-
where in China. In principle, the resulting trade deficit is de-
ducted from the provincial GDP data. For instance, the in-
ternational trade balance of goods and services for the TAR
suddenly fell from a slight surplus in 2002 to a massive
deficit equivalent to 48 percent of GDP in 2003, 71 percent
in 2004, and then back up to 34 percent in 2006 (see Fig-
ure 6). This was similar to the trade deficit that mirrored the
earlier bout of intensive investment from 1992 to 1994. The
more recent deficit was likely due to the railway construc-
tion, which was heavily dependent on imports from abroad
(such as rail carriages from Bombardier in Canada, IT serv-
ices from Nortel, also in Canada, Japanese engineers, and
so on). Deducting this bulge of imports from the calculation
of subsidies would considerably reduce the level of subsidies
as a proportion of GDP, at least from 2003 to 2006. 
However, this does not explain the fact that total subsidies
started to exceed GDP from 2001 onwards, even despite a
trade surplus in 2001 and 2002. In other words, the over-
whelming weight of subsidies in the TAR economy is more
endemic than simply a one-time spending spree by the gov-
ernment on the latest high-tech railway gadgetry. Another
explanation is that the subsidies were being similarly and in-
stantly drained out of the local economy via a trade deficit
with the rest of China. This point was one of the main cri-
tiques made by Wang and Bai, who noted that the trade gap
of the TAR and other poor western provinces with the rest
of China in 1983 was almost equivalent to the total subsidies
received by these provinces. In particular, they pointed out
that 94 percent of merchandise sold in the TAR in 1983
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was imported from the rest of China. (17) They also noted that
financial outflows from these provinces in some cases were
equivalent to the entire sum of central government subsidies
flowing into the same provinces. (18)
While the data is not publicly available to update these ear-
lier estimations, it is fairly obvious that these observations
hold as much, if not more, in the present as in the past. The
relative de-industrialisation of the local economy, together
with the increasing conspicuous consumption of imports in
the urban areas, implies that local production contributes rel-
atively less to local consumption than it did in the past. Sim-
ilarly, the increasing technological content of large-scale con-
struction projects implies that these projects are also proba-
bly increasingly based on imported rather than locally-
sourced inputs, as indicated by the above data on external
trade. Thus, it is quite likely that, in relative structural terms,
the trade deficit of the TAR with other Chinese provinces
has worsened since the early 1980s.
In other words, the high import content of local consumption
and investment describes the structure of boomerang aid, in
that most subsidies entering the TAR leave almost immedi-
ately via the trade account. Subsidies therefore add little to
local economic value-added except by way of profits earned
by intermediaries or wages earned through employment gen-
erated by the subsidies. However, when these profits and
wages are earned by non-locals, they eventually result in fi-
nancial outflows as profits and wages are “repatriated” to
other parts of China, as discussed below. Hence, the only
way to sustain growth in this context is to intensify the flow
of subsidies in order to generate more turn-over, although
this would also tend to accentuate the delinking of such flows
from locally-oriented forms of accumulation.Ins titute d dep ende nce  a nd ef fe ct i ve  di scr im ina tio n
Returning to arguments of Wang and Bai, despite their per-
tinent insights, their analysis is problematic given that it is
rooted in a culturally-derogative interpretation of why these
perversions of development were taking place. They attrib-
uted the causes to the “intrinsic backwardness” of ethnic mi-
norities in these remote western provinces, arguing that such
backwardness resulted in a lack of investment demand rather
than a shortage of savings. As a result, subsidies remained
under- or poorly utilised, local capital accumulation did not
take off as it had among the Han, and nothing inhibited
funds from flowing out of the region or being spent on im-
ported consumption goods rather than synergising a nascent
capitalist ethos. (19) This variant of Marxist modernisation
theory is a common narrative among Chinese scholars or of-
ficials even today. (20)
Wang and Bai unfortunately used their valuable insights to
reinforce a Han paternalistic bias towards minority areas. In-
stead of identifying the state management of the economy
under a context of ethnic subordination as a principle target
of blame, they identified local modes of wealth creation and
accumulation. This is especially ironic given that they ig-
nored the fact that the TAR rural economy had only just de-
collectivised at the time of their field research, after being
completely collectivised a little more than a decade earlier,
or that there was little that was particularly traditional or in-
trinsic in the conditions they observed. The urban economy
itself remained almost entirely state-controlled, more likely
managed by Han rather than Tibetan cadres, particularly up
to 1981. A corrective for their analysis is to turn the focus on
the issue of ownership as a key to understanding the insti-
tuted foundations of dependence and how these generate
polarisation, ethnic discrimination, and exclusion.
Own er sh ip  an d di sempo wermen t
Ownership here refers to the substantive question of who
controls the main levers of the economy, whether through di-
rect ownership of assets or through influence over policies
guiding expenditures and investments, and how this deter-
mines the instituted patterns of structural change in the econ-
omy. Considering the previous discussion on subsidies in the
TAR, it is clear how ownership in everything but the pri-
mary sector is more or less completely dominated by entities
located outside the local economy. In particular, a large
share of direct subsidies, possibly all of the large construc-
tion projects, and even many of the small ones are con-
tracted to out-of-province companies, most of them state-
owned. Even projects that would be ideally suited for using
and improving local Tibetan expertise are also mostly con-
tracted to out-of-province companies and mostly use Han mi-
grant workers. When there is Tibetan participation, it is usu-
ally restricted to the lowest skill levels, and only rarely at the
level of ownership or management. This fact is not only im-
plied in the data; it can also be clearly observed on the
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ground. It is certainly not disputed by local scholars and of-
ficials, some of whom argue that this policy is motivated by
the need for technical assistance and capacity building, and
others that it is simply about choosing the best for your
money, while others admit that there is simply no other
choice – the terms are dictated by the hands that feed. (21)
In terms of these hands that feed, the policy of offering sub-
sidised contracts to out-of-province companies is in part a
necessary means to leverage the self-interest of various
wealthy provinces in their support of central government in-
vestment strategies. However, even centrally-subsidised local
government expenditures unconnected to provincial aid proj-
ects are similarly spent on out-of-province units, reflecting
the fact that the coordination of such investment strategies is
largely determined by the larger regional and national devel-
opment priorities of Beijing, within which the interests of
disempowered Tibetan locals carry little weight. Aid effec-
tively becomes a form of industrial support for engineering
and construction companies. Contracts often represent very
profitable windfalls, up for grab on a one-time basis and with
little concern for long-term sustainability. The railroad is an
excellent example, given that companies participating in this
project acquire a technical and managerial expertise that pre-
pares them to compete on an international scale. U.S. de-
fence spending or international tied aid follows much the
same logic.
While this strategy in the Tibetan areas might be useful for
building strong and competitive national firms, the develop-
ment of locally-owned businesses and local expertise tends to
be sidelined in the process. Ownership in the local economy
is progressively transferred to non-Tibetan outsiders, in the
relative sense that economic value-added is less and less con-
centrated where Tibetans have ownership (i.e. the country-
side), and increasingly based in the urban areas or in infra-
structure and other economic projects where ownership is re-
tained by the investor (such as the railway, a hydroelectric
project, or a mine). It is usually only the smaller “welfare”
projects that might be donated to local governments or com-
munities, such as houses, schools, clinics, or memorial stat-
ues, although even some of these are often transferred at a
cost to the recipient, such as in the case of housing reloca-
tions, where grants to rebuild houses often cover only a frac-
tion of the building costs. (22)
These institutional characteristics of ownership are impor-
tant determinants of inefficiencies in the TAR. Beyond the
more dramatic cases of wasteful spending, (23) externalised
patterns of ownership are at the root of the problem of trade
deficits and financial outflows, much more so than lack of in-
vestment demand or attributes of “intrinsic backwardness” as
argued by Wang and Bai (if indeed their hypothesis has any
validity). The externalised patterns result in a low circulation
of profits and wages in the local economy due to consider-
able leakage from the province. Out-of-province companies
tend to retain and “repatriate” their profits from the lucrative
construction contracts, investing them in other national proj-
ects rather than in the local economy. Companies and their
staff and workers usually return home or move on to other
national jobsites upon completion of the projects, taking
away the benefits of the acquired skills and earnings rather
than investing or spending them in the local economy. In
other words, money goes in and goes out without much
turnover to benefit local production or demand, besides a
skimming of trade and services, which again is dominated by
outsiders and based on imports from elsewhere in China.
Within this context, even if mining proves to be a new “pil-
lar,” it will tend to reinforce the already entrenched dualism
of the economy, given its high-tech and enclave character, to-
gether with the fact that processing will most likely take
place outside the province. Finally, corruption further rein-
forces this process. Unlike elsewhere in China, when project
funding is diverted through corruption, it is usually diverted
outside the TAR.
Even tourism and related industries, which have come to be
touted as the new pillars of growth for the TAR, function in
a similar manner, insofar as much of these industries is con-
trolled by out-of-province businesses and employment domi-
nated by migrant labour. A large share of tourism revenue
therefore simply leaves the region after a short circulation,
perhaps not much longer than the tourists themselves, or
else is saved for later repatriation. Investment in tourism is
similarly limited by its enclave nature, aimed at accessing
and profiting from tourist circuits while carrying few incen-
tives for the diversified reinvestment of profits in the local
economy once such access is sufficiently leveraged. Under
such circumstances, the tourist industry will most likely accen-
tuate the externalised flows of wealth rather than incentivis-
ing local accumulation. The Tibetan medicine industry,
49N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
21. Various versions of these arguments were repeated to me in numerous interviews and
conversations with Han Chinese scholars and officials, including those held at a recent
conference on Tibet convened in Beijing by the China Tibetology Research Centre in
October 2008.
22. See Emily T. Yeh and Mark Henderson, “Interpreting Tibet’s urbanization: Administrative
scales and discourses of modernization,” Journal of the International Association of
Tibetan Studies, vol. 4. See also Robin in this issue.
23. See Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion, op. cit., pp. 74-82, for analysis of how
the institutional characteristics of ownership result in pervasive inefficiencies and even
abuses in the use of subsidies. 
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Spec i a l  Fea tu re
which is increasingly attracting the attention of Han investors,
follows similar patterns in which ownership and head offices
are increasingly located outside of Tibetan areas. 
In sum, the instituted channels through which subsidies are
spent in the local economies of the Tibetan areas are at the
root of boomerang aid. In the absence of protection or pro-
motion of locally-oriented forms of ownership, subsidy inten-
sification simply reinforces externalised patterns of owner-
ship, which in turn provide the institutional foundation for
the acceleration of externalised wealth flows, thereby short-
circuiting local processes of accumulation and reinforcing
subsidy dependence. This is similar to the argument of
Wang and Bai, although they confused symptoms with
causes by postulating that inefficiencies were due to the in-
trinsic backwardness of the minorities themselves, rather
than to their political disempowerment and subordination to
Han-centred political and economic processes. Indeed, such
forced dependent integration into the rest of China is prob-
ably exactly what the government had in mind with its sub-
sidisation strategies in the Tibetan areas.
Fr om dep end en c e  to po lar is ati on  an ddis c rimi na tion  
The accentuation of externalised flows of wealth creates the
conditions for ethnic polarisation and effectively discrimina-
tory forms of exclusion. Locally-oriented processes of wealth
circulation are short-circuited in deference to sources of
wealth that are located outside the local economy, which in
turn accentuates an already-pronounced sectoral polarisa-
tion, as analysed in section one. There is little to bridge the
increasing dualism of the local economy between the two ex-
tremes of the local rural economy and the heavily-subsidised
modern urban economy. As a result, most local Tibetans
face increasing hurdles to integration into the rapidly grow-
ing parts of the economy, particularly in light of their much
lower education levels, especially at the secondary level
where fluency in Chinese is mostly acquired. These chal-
lenges are further exacerbated by the presence of Han and
Muslim Chinese migrants who are attracted to the artifi-
cially-subsidised affluence of the cities and towns of the
TAR. The migrants are hardly to blame, as they are merely
following the same economic incentives that attract many Ti-
betans from the countryside to these same cities and towns,
including many Tibetans from Tibetan areas outside the
TAR. Rather, the causes of the polarising dynamics reside
in the way the subsidies are channelled into the economy. 
Because flows of wealth become increasingly centred out-
side the local economy, the main beneficiaries of growth are
those who are well-positioned to access these externalised
flows, be they Tibetan or Chinese, government officials,
traders and businesspeople, or even formal sector workers.
Moreover, because these flows are instituted by members of
the dominant Han Chinese nationality, they produce struc-
tures of advantage along axes that include important Han
Chinese attributes, such as Chinese fluency, Chinese work
cultures, and connections to government or business net-
works in China Proper. The social, political, and economic
reproduction of this minority in the provincial labour force
therefore bears little relation to the indigeneity of the Ti-
betan areas. There are few incentives to direct such elite
wealth into locally-oriented forms of accumulation, given that
much more money can be made with much greater ease
through privileged access to state patronage, rather than
through painstaking and relatively petty profit-making activi-
ties based in local productive activities. As a result, there is
little dispersion or linkages of the externalised flows of
wealth into the local economy, and outflows of wealth are
privileged at the expense of local reinvestment. Those ex-
cluded from privileged access, whether the majority of Ti-
betans or even many poor Chinese migrants, are in turn pro-
gressively marginalised from these dominant processes of ac-
cumulation driving growth in the local economy. A sharp po-
larisation of wealth thereby ensues.
The simplest way to represent the polarisation of wealth is
through rising urban-rural inequality. The ratio of per capita
urban disposable household income over per capita rural
household income in the TAR, already the highest in China
in 1995, increased sharply to a peak of 5.8 in 2002 (see Fig-
ure 7), a level never before seen in the PRC, where urban-
rural inequality is generally a serious concern. (24) Moreover,
this sharp increase occurred precisely at the same time as it
was falling nationally and in every other western province due
to a combination of pro-rural poverty reduction strategies and
the agricultural recovery from 1994 to 1997. The disparity in-
crease in the TAR reflects the fact that real rural incomes
were stagnant throughout the 1990s according to official
data, while urban incomes in the TAR were above the na-
tional average due to a surge in the wages of staff and work-
ers (mostly state-sector), which reached the highest in China
in 2002 and 2004. In other words, the take-off of the TAR
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in the mid-1990s was primarily urban and excessively de-
linked from the local rural economy, at least up until the early
2000s. 
Urban-rural inequality started to fall in the TAR after 2002,
partly reflecting strong growth in official rural incomes after
2002. However, if these data do in fact represent real
changes, the reversal in urban-rural inequality in the TAR
from 2002 onwards might also be explained by the fact that
the Tibetan labour force experienced one of the fastest, al-
beit latest shifts out of agriculture from the late 1990s on-
wards. The TAR had the most agrarian workforce in China
up to 1999, with 76 percent of the labour force employed in
the primary sector. This primary share then suddenly fell by
more than 12 percent up to 2004, even while the TAR re-
mained one of the most agrarian provinces in China. (25) This
corroborates strongly with the recent field observations by
Goldstein et al (2008), (26) who argue that a rapid “paradigm
shift” has taken place in rural Tibet from a predominantly
subsistence agricultural economy to a new mixed economy in
which non-farm income plays a dominant role. Given that
rural off-farm economic opportunities in Tibetan areas re-
main limited compared to most other regions of China, shifts
out of agriculture in these areas largely imply urbanisation.
Rapid urbanisation in turn tends to balance out urban-rural
inequality, if only by reducing the absolute number people in
the rural areas.
Parallel to these transitions, urban-rural inequality has also
probably transitioned into intra-urban inequality since the
late 1990s. It is difficult to derive an exact measurement of
urban inequality in the TAR, given that the urban workforce
is dominated by non-Tibetan migrant workers, who are not
usually included in any of the household surveys (which only
include permanent residents). Intra-urban inequality among
those registered as permanently-residing was already high in
the late 1990s in comparison to the rest of China, which can
be explained by the fact that about half of the urban work-
force was employed as relatively privileged state-sector staff
and workers and benefited from some of the highest salaries
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in the country, while the unprivileged lower half experienced
some of the highest urban poverty rates in China. (27)
From this baseline in the late 1990s, there are strong indica-
tions that intra-urban inequality increased much more sharply
in the TAR than elsewhere in China. (28) This suggests that
little urban wealth in the TAR dispersed outside the state
sector, and that the wealth of those without access to state
sector employment had rapidly fallen behind the sharp wage
increases of those with state-sector employment. Essentially,
there is a dual economy within the urban areas themselves,
confirming the suggestion that the recent decline in urban-
rural inequality is not so much an end of polarisation, but
rather a reconstitution of such polarisation in the urban areas
through urbanisation, with intra-urban inequality becoming a
new fault line of polarisation in the region.
It is also important to note that the educational divide does
not necessarily follow the urban-rural divide. About 41 per-
cent of the permanent resident adult city population in the
TAR was illiterate in 2004, according to official surveys.
This is an exceptionally high level of urban illiteracy for
China, with no parallel in any other province. For various
reasons, most of these illiterates were probably Tibetan. 
In this context, the Tibetans more suited to profit from the
instituted patterns of growth comprise the 12 percent of Ti-
betans with some form of secondary education or above in
2005. (29) These are probably the only Tibetans who have a
decent degree of fluency in Chinese. Together with Tibetan
migrants from eastern Tibet in Sichuan, they are therefore
the only ones who can hope to take advantage of economic
opportunities based on Chinese fluency, Chinese work cul-
tures, and connections to government or business networks
with China. However, even these relatively educated Ti-
betans tend to face strong exclusionary pressures in local em-
ployment, given that their education (particularly their Chi-
nese fluency) is generally poorer than that of migrants com-
peting for jobs at similar strata of the labour hierarchy, espe-
cially since the introduction of competitive selection proce-
dures for public employment. (30)Concl usio n:  F ro m po la ri sa tionto ex cl usion 
This article examined how the instituting of rapid growth in
the Tibetan areas of west China since the mid-1990s has it-
self been a crucial factor exacerbating the unresolved contes-
tations of Chinese rule in these areas through its accentua-
tion of polarisation and effective ethnic discrimination. This
was first analysed in terms of the sectoral structure of rapid
economic growth in the TAR since the early 1990s. No-
tably, sectoral transformation in the TAR economy occurred
much more rapidly than in other western provinces in China.
It was unique in that it was based mostly on alternating bouts
of expansion in either government administration or large-
scale construction projects, both disconnected from local pro-
ductive activities. Hence, there was a sharp divergence be-
tween the primary and tertiary shares of the GDP, with lit-
tle secondary productivities activities to link the two, con-
trary to all other cases in China. 
Second, polarisation was rooted in heavily-subsidised state-led
development strategies of expenditure and investment, which
together were equivalent to more than the total economic ac-
tivity in the TAR since 2001. This situation is explained by
the fact that the development strategies have intensified inter-
national and domestic trade deficits as well as financial out-
flows at the expense of local reinvestment or accumulation.
While the recently completed railway from Qinghai to the
TAR is one extreme example of such strategies, the character
of these strategies was well entrenched since the late 1960s.
The railway was merely an intensification of the institutional
norms guiding the subsidisation of this politically-sensitive re-
gion since the later Maoist period. As a result, recent strate-
gies have not significantly altered the long-term trend of very
intense and very inefficient subsidisation. Rather, rapid
growth since the mid-1990s has been the consequence of an-
other bout of inefficient subsidy intensification.
The last section examined how patterns of ownership in the
local economy provide the foundation for such inefficiencies
and external dependence. Resultant polarisation and effec-
tive ethnic discrimination are reflected by rising urban-rural
and intra-urban inequalities in the TAR to levels much higher
than elsewhere in China. Given that most of the reins driv-
ing wealth creation and accumulation outside agriculture are
located outside the TAR, development strategies intensify an
externalisation of wealth flows within the upper layers of the
economic structure, in the sense that inflows and outflows of
financial and other resources are prioritised and facilitated
over and above comparable flows within the local economy.
Outflows of wealth are thereby exacerbated even while sub-
sidies and investment pour in, offering little propensity for lo-
cally-oriented forms of circulation or accumulation.
Because wealth is closely associated with positions of access
to these externally-oriented flows driving growth, the state-
52 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
27. See Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion, op. cit., pp. 121-123 for further detail.
28. See Fischer, “Educating for Exclusion”, art. cit, p. 11-13 for further detail
29. Calculated from CSY, 2006, Table 4-12.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
The Political Economy of Boomerang Aid in China’s Tibet
subsidised development strategies carry an important ethni-
cally-discriminatory institutional bias. This does not imply
that all Tibetans are necessarily disadvantaged, but that the
wealth of the well positioned, whether Chinese or Tibetan,
is increasingly determined by factors located outside the
local economy and instituted along lines that confer advan-
tage not only to political obedience, but more generally to
cultural or linguistic attributes deriving from members of the
dominant group that controls the externalised flows. In the
Tibetan context, these attributes include Chinese fluency,
Chinese work cultures, and connections to government or
business networks in China Proper. The Tibetans who are
most likely to excel in these attributes are those with second-
ary education and above, who comprised about 12 percent
of the population in 2005.
This is not to say that the average Tibetan has not benefited
from growth; rising per capita GDP suggests that Tibetans
on average have in fact been enjoying gradual improvement
in their economic situations through the “trickle down” ef-
fect. Yet it would be surprising if these improvements had
not taken place, given the sheer torrent of subsidies that the
central government has channelled into the TAR. What is
surprising is how little does in fact trickle down. The govern-
ment argues that this is not a problem so long as the situa-
tion of the average Tibetan is gradually improving, although
this defence ignores the exclusionary implications of polari-
sation, which lead to a form of economic segregation based
on privileged access to the state-controlled levers of almost
all aspects of the economy outside agriculture.
Importantly, we can observe these exclusionary processes
operating even among relatively well-educated Tibetans.
Some of the strongest exclusionary pressures are faced by
Tibetans who in fact offer the greatest potential to overcome
skills disjunctures or culturally-defined axes of discrimina-
tion, such as upwardly-mobile rural migrants, high school
and university graduates, or laid-off state sector workers.
This stratum of the labour force is under considerable com-
petitive pressure due to the rapidly inflating institutional cri-
teria that accompany the massive increases in subsidisation
and investment from elsewhere in China. While inequality
provides an important signal of these processes, it does not
describe the entirety of exclusionary processes at work, given
that many of those facing urban exclusion do not necessarily
show up at the bottom end of the regional income distribu-
tion.
In this sense, our understanding of current tensions in Tibet
needs to be grounded not only in the historical context of po-
litical subordination but also in the heightened degree of
economic and social polarisation generated by the latest
phase of intense subsidisation since the mid-1990s. Local
initiatives and locally-generated investment and accumula-
tion play a very minute role in the overall processes of eco-
nomic change in the Tibetan areas. In the tense political en-
vironment, they might even be discouraged. In the TAR in
particular, where subsidisation has reached its zenith, the
local Tibetan population has been rendered more or less ir-
relevant as agents causing growth. Meaningful decentralisa-
tion has simply not taken place in Tibet the way it has in
most other areas of China during the reform period.
This particular lack of agency exacerbates a feeling of alien-
ation despite all of the monumental change and pockets of
affluence. The policies that guide development in Tibet
have been essentially promulgated from Beijing as top-down
dictates following the trends of national development policy.
Policies are then implemented, effectively or ineffectively, by
local authorities, themselves appointed by Beijing, with the
assistance of a corps of professionals and cadres from around
the country on terms of duty that usually last two to three
years. Elite Tibetans often make up a large share of local-
level government officials, although rarely at the most senior
positions or with any substantive power. Due to the fiscal
monopoly of Beijing and the political and security paranoia
that grips the Tibetan areas, these local Tibetan officials
mostly toe the line set out from above. And even these priv-
ileged Tibetans must face regular humiliation in the form of
an evermore-confident sense of Han chauvinism from their
Chinese superiors. 
In this light, it is true that the CCP has spent a great deal
of money in Tibet, but not necessarily on Tibetans. It is
probably not the case that China has taken more from Tibet
than it has given, as is often argued by many Tibetan exiles.
However, whatever China has given to Tibet, it has largely
given to itself, in the sense that the recipients are mostly
Han Chinese. Like a boomerang, such aid returns to its
sender while debilitating the agency of its purported benefi-
ciary. Indeed, this may be precisely what Beijing intends by
such strategies. However, in this case, it is also perfectly log-
ical that the consequences would accentuate a perception
among Tibetans that autonomy is urgently needed in order
to effectively address their rapid marginalisation within de-
velopment. •
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As elsewhere in the world, population transitions have
been fundamental to the appearance of modernity in
Tibet. These transitions include population growth,
urbanisation, and increased non-Tibetan in-migration
from other parts of China (largely Han Chinese and, to
a lesser extent, Chinese Muslims). However, the fact
that these population transitions started around the
same time as communist rule in 1950 has led to their
conflation with the related but distinct issue of occupa-
tion. As a result, some of the most vigorous condemna-
tions as well as defences of PRC rule in Tibet have
come to be framed in terms of population.
Despite the reigning view in the West and among
Tibetan exiles that Han Chinese migrants are flooding
the Tibetan areas, possibly reducing Tibetans to a
minority in their own land, this perception is partially
misconceived. It is only in the main strategic cities and
towns of Tibet where it can be plausibly argued that
Han are outnumbering Tibetans. This is counterbal-
anced by more rapid rates of natural population
increase in Tibetan rural areas – among the highest in
China. Notably, Tibetan areas remain among the most
rural of China, and Tibetan rural areas remain almost
entirely Tibetan, even in eastern Tibet outside the
TAR. According to the 2000 census in China,
Tibetans were overwhelmingly rural in all of the five
Chinese provinces that incorporate Tibetan areas, with
87.2 percent living in rural areas overall, ranging from
91.4 percent in Qinghai, to 90.9 percent in Gansu,
89.5 percent in Sichuan, 84.8 percent in the TAR and
80 percent in Yunnan. Rates of population increase
among these rural Tibetans are significantly higher than
among the Han (although these rates have been falling,
as elsewhere in China). In contrast, in-migrating Han
Chinese do not tend to bring their families and settle,
with the exception of some Muslims. Thus, it is actual-
ly quite plausible that the proportion of Tibetans in the
overall population has been rising, not falling, particu-
larly in Tibetan areas outside of the TAR that are
much less subsidised and thus attract relatively fewer
migrants. However, even if Tibetans are a majority of
the population, most of this majority resides in rural
areas, where it is not visible to casual observation. 
From this perspective, the perception of population
swamping is essentially an urban-centric assessment of
the changing ethnic composition of Tibet. Rising popu-
lation density and rapid urban expansion can give the
visual impression that the more urbanised or economi-
cally successful groups (Han or Muslims) are becoming
more dominant, even while they are only maintaining
or even losing their share in the overall population.
This is not to say that there is no problem, but that the
problem is misinterpreted. The fundamental problem is
that non-Tibetan migrants definitely dominate urban
economic opportunities. Cities and towns are precisely
where the political and economic levers of power are
controlled and the long-term trajectories of ethnic strat-
ification determined, particularly at this critical transi-
tional juncture in Tibet. 
Therefore, Tibetan perceptions of population swamp-
ing seem to express a malaise with exclusionary
processes in the context of rapid urban-centred develop-
ment. While probably misconceived, these perceptions
can be seen as a reactive lens through which Tibetans
interpret their very legitimate grievances within a con-
text of stark political and economic disempowerment.•
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Adapted from Andrew M. Fischer: 
• “‘Population Invasion’ versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western China,” Population and
Development Review, No. 34(4), December 2008, pp. 631-662.
